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PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
Determination of the Amount in Controversy
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has long restricted the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over diversity of citizenship cases by requiring that a mini-
mum amount of money be in controversy.1 Various justifications
for this requirement have been advanced. The original purpose is
said to have been to "prevent defendants from being summoned
long distances to defend small claims."'2 Congress' stated purpose
in raising the minimum amount to greater than $10,000 was to
prevent the federal courts from having to "fritter away their time
in the trial of petty controversies. ' 3 While Congress was clear on
what the minimum amount would be, it did not instruct the
courts on how that amount is to be measured.' This issue has been
left to the federal courts for resolution.
When a civil action that might have been brought in federal
court is brought in a state court, Congress has given the defen-
dant the right to remove the action to federal court., An action
can be removed only if the federal court would have had original
jurisdiction of the action.' A troubling situation occurs when pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute7 a resident plaintiff brings suit
1. The minimum amount was first set at $500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 78. This was then raised to $2,000. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552. In
1911 the amount was again raised to $3,000. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 2, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091.
The current statute requires an amount in excess of $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970)). Exactly
$10,000 is insufficient. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir. 1975).
2. HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 33 (2d ed.
1973).
3. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3099, 3101.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs . Id.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970) reads:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
Id.
6. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 908 (1977); J.J.
Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp. 692 (D.S.C. 1974); Davis v.
Matson Nav. Co., 143 F. Supp. 537 (D. Cal. 1956).
7. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
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in state court against a nonresident defendant alleging damages
of $10,000 or less and the defendant files a compulsory counter-
claim8 for a greater amount. If the defendant had won the race
to the courthouse, he could have filed originally in federal court
because complete diversity of citizenship exists and the amount
in controversy would exceed $10,000. When the plaintiff already
has filed in state court, the issue is whether the defendant may
remove the action to federal court and satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement with his counterclaim. This issue was faced
by the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina in Congaree Broadcasters, Inc. v. T.M. Programming,
Inc.'
In Congaree Broadcasters, a South Carolina radio station
brought suit in state court against a Texas corporation. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant had breached a programming contract by
failing to provide suitable programming. The complaint sought
rescission of the contract and the return of an $1800 deposit that
had been paid by plaintiff to defendant. Defendant removed the
action to the federal district court and simultaneously filed with
that court its answer and counterclaim. Defendant denied that it
had breached the contract and alleged that plaintiff itself was in
breach because of its failure to make timely payments. Defendant
in its counterclaim sought damages of $19,800, the unpaid bal-
ance of the contract, along with attorneys' fees, costs, and expen-
ses. Plaintiff moved to remand the action to the state court on
the ground that only $1800 was in controversy.' 0
The court held that the amount in controversy requirement
was satisfied. The court in its opinion touched on three separate
rationales that it said supported this holding. First, the court
indicated that it would look to the value of the object in contro-
versy." It found this amount to be $21,600, which was the total
value of the contract. Second, the court found that, under the
either-party viewpoint test, defendant stood to gain or lose more
than $10,000 depending upon the outcome of the litigation.'2 Last,
8. Compulsory counterclaims are defined in FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a). Permissive coun-
terclaims, as defined in FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b), will not be considered in this article.
9. 436 F. Supp. 258 (D.S.C. 1977).
10. Id. at 259.
11. Id.
12. The court stated: "This court is of the opinion, that the object sought to be
accomplished by the controversy, as reflected from the plaintiff's complaint, as well as
the defendant's counterclaim, was the determination of the rights of the parties under a
contract, which was admittedly in excess of $10,000." Id. at 261.
1979]
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the court found that it was proper to utilize the amount sought
in a compulsory counterclaim to satisfy the-amount in contro-
versy requirement.'" Because the amount in controversy require-
ment provokes frequent pretrial disputes in federal courts, each
of these rationales deserves closer attention.
II. VALUE OF THE OBJECT IN CONTROVERSY
The first test for determining jurisdictional amount dis-
cussed in Congaree Broadcasters involves measuring the value of
the matter in dispute. The court held that the claim and counter-
claim had injected the entire contract into dispute and that the
total value of the contract therefore should be used to satisfy the
requirement."4 The court relied on Smith v. Adams, ' ' a nineteenth
century United States Supreme Court decision. The Supreme
Court held:
By matter in dispute is meant the subject of the litigation, the
matter upon which the action is brought . . . . It is conceded
that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be deter-
mined, not only by the money judgment prayed . . ., but in
some cases the increased or diminished value of the property
directly affected by the relief prayed, or the pecuniary result to
one of the parties immediately from judgement."
The phrase in the statute, "matter in controversy," appears to be
broad enough to encompass the result reached in Congaree
Broadcasters by using the value of the object in controversy test.
7
Use of this test when only monetary damages are being sought,
however, might be inconsistent with its prior uses.
The test has typically been used by courts in suits seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief.' One of the earliest uses of this
test can be found in Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward,"9
another nineteenth century United States Supreme Court deci-
13. Id. at 262.
14. Id. at 259.
15. 130 U.S. 167 (1889).
16. Id. at 175.
17. Courts have interpreted "matter in controversy" broadly, holding that it includes
the demands of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167 (1889),
Central Commercial Co. v. Jones Dusenbury Co., 251 F. 13 (7th Cir. 1918).
18. See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light Heat & P. Co., 239 U.S. 121
(1915); Hunt v. New York Cotton Exch. 205 U.S. 322 (1907); Jackson v. American Bar
Association, 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, affl'd, 479 F.2d
1044 (D.C. Tex. 1972).
19. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862).
[Vol. 30
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sion. A steamboat captain alleged that a railroad bridge spanning
the Mississippi River was a nuisance to navigation. The com-
plaint asked the court to order defendant railroad company to
dismantle and remove the bridge. The Court did not attempt to
measure the damage sustained by plaintiff. It held that "as the
removal of the obstruction is the matter in controversy, the value
of the object must govern." 0 In a more recent decision,2' the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this use of the test by stating that "in
actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well estab-
lished that the amount in controversy is measured by the value
of the object of the litigation."
The court in Congaree Broadcasters also relied upon Beacon
Construction Co. v. Matco Electric Co." Beacon, like Ward, in-
volved declaratory relief, so the court's reliance might have been
misplaced. In Beacon, plaintiff-contractor brought suit against
defendant-subcontractor, alleging that defendant had wrongfully
filed mechanics' liens of more than $300,000 upon a project being
completed by plaintiff. These liens encumbered the property and
prevented the release of funds to plaintiff by its construction
lender. Plaintiff was forced to pay $3516 for a surety bond to
obtain the release of the funds. The suit, which was filed in fed-
eral district court, sought both an award of the $3516 bond prem-
ium and a declaratory judgement that the liens were void.2 1 On
appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff,
defendant asserted that only the amount of the bond premium
was in controversy. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, holding that "[tihe amount in controversy is not
the money judgment sought or recovered, but rather the value of
the consequences which may result from the litigation." The
litigation resulted not only in a judgment for plaintiff for the
amount of the bond premium, but also in a declaration that the
mechanics' liens were void. The court therefore held that the
jurisdictional amount requirement was satisfied.6
The "value of the object test" was therefore applied in an
unusual setting in Congaree Broadcasters. Neither party sought
injunctive or declaratory relief. The court's use of this test, while
20. Id. at 492.
21. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advert. Comm's, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
22. Id. at 347.
23. 521 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. Id. at 394-95.
25. Id. at 399.
26. Id.
1979]
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unorthodox, does not offend the purpose of the jurisdictional
amount requirement. If a court, in examining the facts of a case
before it, determines that the object of the controversy exceeds
$10,000, then perhaps it should accept jurisdiction regardless of
the relief demanded.
IIM. THE EITHER-PARTY VmWpoINT RULE
The court in Congaree Broadcasters also indicated that it
would find the amount in controversy requirement satisfied if
either party to the litigation could reasonably project a loss
greater than $10,000.27 The court noted that much authority ex-
ists for the proposition that only the result to the plaintiff may
be taken into account in determining the amount in controversy. 2
The arguments for and against the "either-party viewpoint rule"
as adopted in Congaree Broadcasters should be discussed at some
length.
The conflict between the plaintiff viewpoint rule and the
either-party viewpoint rule arises only in cases the resolution of
which will have a disparate financial impact upon the plaintiff
and defendant. In an ordinary damages action, the gain to the
plaintiff resulting from a favorable judgment will exactly equal
the loss of the defendant. No need arises, therefore, to examine
the result of a judgment from the viewpoint of both parties. If,
however, the claim is for equitable relief, such as an injunction,
the possibility that the plaintiff's gain will not equal the defen-
dant's loss is greatly increased. For instance, if a plaintiff land-
owner seeks an injunction ordering a corporation to abate a
nuisance caused by pollution from its factory, the monetary con-
sequences to the corporation of an adverse ruling might far exceed
any benefit to be gained by the landowner. When the plaintiff's
potential gain is less than or equal to $10,000 and the defendant's
potential loss is greater than $10,000, the decision whether to look
only at the plaintiff's viewpoint or to look at the viewpoint of
either party determines whether the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement will be deemed to have been met.
The plaintiff viewpoint rule was articulated by Dean Dobie
as follows: "The amount in controversy in the United States Dis-
trict Court is always to be determined by the value to the plaintiff
of the right which he in good faith asserts in his pleading that sets
27. 436 F. Supp. 258, 260.
28. Id.
[Vol. 30
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forth the operative facts which constitute his cause of action."29
This rule, in one form or another, has been accepted by many
courts. 0
Proponents of the plaintiff viewpoint rule often cite as their
primary authority the Supreme Court's 1915 decision in
Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power
Co.31 Glenwood was an action for injunctive relief. Plaintiff, an
electric utility, alleged that defendant, another utility, had
erected poles and wires in close proximity to those of plaintiff,
with the result that plaintiff's workmen were hampered in their
efforts to properly maintain plaintiff's facilities. Plaintiff sought
an order requiring defendant to relocate the poles and wires. De-
fendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its
costs in removing its poles and wires would be less than $3000,
the jurisdictional amount at that time. The district court dis-
missed the complaint, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the decision of the lower court, held:
The district court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the
amount it would cost defendant to remove its poles and wires
where they conflict or interfere with those of complainant, and
replacing them in such a position as to avoid the interference.
Complainant sets up a right to maintain and operate its plant
and conduct its business free from wrongful interference by de-
fendant. This right is alleged to be of a value in excess of the
jurisdictional amount, and at the hearing no question seems to
have been made but that it has such value. The relief sought is
the protection of that right, now and in the future, and the value
of that protection is determinative of the jurisdiction. 2
This language does seem to lend support to those who adhere to
the plaintiff viewpoint rule. One leading commentator, however,
has pointed out that the holding of Glenwood is only that jurisdic-
tion is present if the value to the plaintiff exceeds the jurisdic-
tional amount.3 The Court did not hold, and has never held, that
29. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARV. L.
REv. 733, 734 (1925).
30. See, e.g., Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription
Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970); Breault v. Feigenholtz, 380 F.2d 90 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967); Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth.,
308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962).
31. 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
32. Id. at 125.
33. 14 C. WRIMT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 3703
(1976) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIc.HT].
1979]
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the jurisdictional amount requirement can never be met by exam-
ining the impact the particular relief sought will have upon the
defendant.
Proponents of the plaintiff viewpoint rule assert two general
justifications. First, they point out that the plaintiff viewpoint
rule is consistent with the authority requiring a plaintiff to show
federal jurisdiction in the complaint." Second, they assert that
utilizing only the plaintiff's viewpoint will avoid the confusion
and complications that might arise if the defendant's viewpoint
is also taken into consideration.
35
The either-party viewpoint rule, as accepted by Judge
Hemphill in Congaree Broadcasters, appears to be gaining in-
creasing support in the lower federal courts. 36 An early decision
of the Tenth Circuit, Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W.R. Co.,31 is per-
haps the prime example of the application of the either-party
viewpoint rule. Ronzio arose out of a battle between a farmer and
a railroad over water rights. The farmer, in a state court action,
sought to quiet title to his water rights. The parties stipulated
that the value of plaintiff's asserted rights was less than the juris-
dictional amount as it existed at that time.3 Defendant railroad
sought to remove the action to federal court; it claimed that the
value to it of the water in dispute was much more than the juris-
dictional amount. Plaintiff did not contest this claim,39 but he
nevertheless moved to remand the action to the state court on the
ground that the amount in controversy requirement was not met.
The appellate court, in affirming the order of the district court
sustaining jurisdiction, held in part: "In determining the matter
in controversy, we may look to the object sought to be accom-
plished by the plaintiffs complaint; the test for determining the
amount in controversy is the pecuniary result to either party
which the judgment would directly produce."4 A large number of
courts have followed this rule as enunciated in Ronzio.4'
34. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE 0.91[1] (2nd ed. 1978).
35. Id. See also Dobie, supra note 29, at 752.
36. 14 C. WRIGHT, supra note 30, at § 3703.
37. 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
38. Id. at 605.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted).
41. See, e.g., Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Hartridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964). For an exhaustive listing of cases supporting
both the plaintiff viewpoint rule and the either-party viewpoint rule, see Annot., 30
A.L.R.2d 602 (1953).
[Vol. 30
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The either-party viewpoint rule seems to be more desirable
than the plaintiff viewpoint rule. It adequately serves the purpose
of the jurisdictional amount requirement-to screen trivial cases
out of the federal court system-without excluding cases that will
undeniably have more than a trivial impact upon the defendant.2
The facts of Congaree Broadcasters demonstrate well this func-
tion of the rule. Plaintiff sought rescission of the contract and the
return of the $1800 previously paid by it to defendant. If the court
had applied the plaintiff viewpoint rule, it would have had to
ignore the fact that granting plaintiff the equitable relief it re-
quested would result in a loss to defendant of an amount exceed-
ing the $10,000 jurisdictional amount-that is, the $19,800 un-
paid balance due defendant under the contract. By adopting the
either-party viewpoint rule, the district court has fallen into line
with the other courts that value economic reality over a hard-and-
fast rule that can lead to results inconsistent with the reasoning
behind the jurisdictional amount requirement.
IV. THE AMOUNT OF A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
As a third basis for finding the jurisdictional amount require-
ment satisfied, the court in Congaree Broadcasters included the
amount of the compulsory counterclaim in calculating the juris-
dictional amount. Courts are clearly split on whether this use of
compulsory counterclaims is proper. Some courts have held that
a counterclaim may be considered, arguing that the plaintiff
should not be "entitled to reduce the controversy to the mere
amount of damages he claims because the controversy insepara-
bly involves not just whether he can recover any damages but
whether he is answerable to the defendant for the damages which
the plaintiff inflicted on the defendant."43 The other line of cases
denies the use of a counterclaim to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement." This split in the lower federal courts has
been caused largely by the ambiguity of the leading Supreme
42. See Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in
Controversy, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1375 (1960).
43. National Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 F. Supp. 658, 662 (M.D.N.C. 1956). See
also Rosenblum v. Trullinger, 118 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Lange v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951); McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic
Stages Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
44. Cabe v. Pennwalt Corp., 372 F. Supp. 780 (W.D.N.C. 1974); West Va. State Bar
v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118 (D.W. Va. 1972); Burton Lines Inc. v. Mansky, 265 F. Supp.
489 (D.N.C. 1967); Rudder v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
1979]
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Court decision, Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.45
In Horton, plaintiff originally claimed $14,035 in benefits
before the Texas Industrial Accident Board and was awarded
$1050. The defendant, an insurance company, brought suit in
federal court to overturn the Accident Board's award. Defendant
alleged diversity and maintained that the amount in controversy
was the original claim of $14,035, not the award of $1050. Horton
brought suit in state court for $14,035, moved for dismissal in
federal court because the amount in controversy was only the
final award of $1,050, and filed a contingent compulsory counter-
claim for $14:035. The majority of the Court held that "no matter
which party brings it into court, the controversy remains the
same; it involves the same amount of money and is to be adjudi-
cated and determined under the same rules. Unquestionably,
therefore, the amount in controversy is in excess of $10,000."' 4
The leading commentators have found it impossible to state
the principle for which Horton stands.47 The possibilities range
from a holding that Horton allows good faith allegations in the
complaint of what the defendant will claim to be considered in
determining the amount in controversy,48 to a holding that
Horton's applicability is strictly limited to the peculiar nature of
Texas Workmen's Compensation Law.49 Because the Supreme
Court has not yet shed further light on this opinion, the lower
federal courts have split in their interpretations of how it affects
the use of counterclaims in determining the amount in contro-
versy.
Courts that have held that counterclaims cannot be used to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement"' have advanced,
either separately or together, three arguments based on statutory
45. 367 U.S. 438 (1961).
46. Id. at 354.
47. "Unless further light is shed on this case by later decisions, it is difficult to the
point of impossibility to state the principle for which Horton stands." 14 C. Wmowrr, supra
note 33, at § 3706. See also 1 MoosE's FEDERAL PRACrEc 0.93[5-3] (1978).
48. 14 C. WRIGHT, supra note 33, at § 3706.
49. Insurance Co. of No. America v. Keeling, 360 F.2d 88, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966) limited Horton to the fact that the workman was claiming
$14,035 in state court and also conditionally claiming the same amount (pending his
motion for dismissal) in federal court. See Gordon v. Dargle, 230 F. Supp. 819, 822 (W.D.
La. 1964).
50. National Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 F. Supp. 658, 662 (M.D. N.C. 1956). See
also Rosenblum v. Trullinger, 118 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Lange v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951); McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic
Stages, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
[Vol. 30
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construction of different sections of the Judicial Code to justify
their holding. One section provides that a plaintiff who recovers
less than $10,000 can have costs assessed against him.5' Because
there is no corresponding provision to assess costs of an action
against a defendant whose counterclaim is used to satisfy the
amount requirement, Congress, it is argued, did not intend a
counterclaim to be used.5?2 The second argument is premised upon
the removal section,53 which gives only defendants the power to
remove. If Congress intended counterclaims to be used to satisfy
amount requirements it would have also given plaintiffs the
power to remove an action after the defendant files a sufficient
counterclainOY Proponents of the third argument advanced ob-
serve that prior to the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the same
conflict arose over use of counterclaims." If Congress had desired
to grant a defendant (or a plaintiff) the right to remove basing
the jurisdictional amount upon a counterclaim, it would have
done so. They argue that because the basis for federal court juris-
diction is wholly statutory, and because these statutes should be
strictly construed,56 the courts should avoid doing judicially what
Congress has refrained from doing statutorily.
Courts which have upheld the use of compulsory counter-
claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement have
done so by focusing on the statutory language "matter in contro-
versy" and concluding that this language is broad enough to in-
clude both plaintiff's claim and that which must be litigated with
it, a compulsory counterclaim. 57 To hold otherwise would encour-
age persons with small claims who might be subject to a claim
by a nonresident for a large amount to race to state court and thus
deprive the nonresident the right to resort to federal courts."
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1970).
52. Cabe v. Pennwalt Corp., 372 F. Supp. 780, 782 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1973).
54. Cabe v. Pennwalt Corp., 372 F. Supp. 780, 782 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Rudder v. Ohio
Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 577, 578-79 (E.D. Ky. 1962); Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R.
Co., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
55. Collins v. Faucett, 87 F. Supp. 254, 255 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
56. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934); Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Okl. 1976); West Va. State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118 (D.W. Va.
1972); Dowlingv. J.C. Penney Co., 30 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
57. National Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 F. Supp. 658, 662 (M.D.N.C. 1956). See
also Rosenblum v. Trullinger, 118 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Lange v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951); McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic
Stages Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
58. See Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Amount in
Controversy, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1378-80 (1960).
1979]
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Without clarifying opinions from higher courts, the district
court split will remain unresolved. This split undesirably serves
to promote the litigation of threshold jurisdictional issues. Para-
doxically, the minimum amount in controversy requirement,
whose purpose was said to be to conserve the federal courts' re-
sources, has instead been the subject of considerable litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of Congaree Broadcasters for practitioners in
South Carolina is not to be underestimated. The court, in a sin-
gle, relative short opinion, has apparently settled the controver-
sies over whose viewpoint a court should look at and how compul-
sory counterclaims should be treated in determining the presence
of the jurisdictional amount. Judge Hemphill has wisely kept in
mind the purposes behind the amount in controversy requirement
and, as a result, has created strong precedent to allow a judge to
look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding a case to
determine if the jurisdictional amount requirement is met.
George A. Harper
[Vol. 30
11
Harper: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
